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ABSTRACT
A dominant regulatory model for web privacy is “notice and choice”.
In this model, users are notified of data collection and provided
with options to control it. To examine the efficacy of this approach,
this study presents the first large-scale audit of disclosure of third-
party data collection in website privacy policies. Data flows on one
million websites are analyzed and over 200,000 websites’ privacy
policies are audited to determine if users are notified of the names of
the companies which collect their data. Policies from 25 prominent
third-party data collectors are also examined to provide deeper
insights into the totality of the policy environment. Policies are
additionally audited to determine if the choice expressed by the
“Do Not Track” browser setting is respected.
Third-party data collection is wide-spread, but fewer than 15%
of attributed data flows are disclosed. The third-parties most likely
to be disclosed are those with consumer services users may be
aware of, those without consumer services are less likely to be
mentioned. Policies are difficult to understand and the average time
requirement to read both a given site’s policy and the associated
third-party policies exceeds 84 minutes. Only 7% of first-party site
policies mention the Do Not Track signal, and the majority of such
mentions are to specify that the signal is ignored. Among third-
party policies examined, none offer unqualified support for the Do
Not Track signal. Findings indicate that current implementations
of “notice and choice” fail to provide notice or respect choice.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Although many users may not be aware, web pages are not unitary
objects downloaded directly from the party listed in a browser’s
address bar. Rather, most web pages are a collection of media ele-
ments which are either downloaded from the first-party a user is
aware of, or from third-parties a user may not know of. When a
page includes third-party content, HTTP “Referer” headers convey
the address of the page the user is currently visiting to third-parties.
While users may be happy to see third-party content in a web page,
they may not be happy that such content allows third-parties to
create records of their browsing behaviors. The process of using
third-party HTTP Referer headers to observe users’ web browsing
is often referred to as “web tracking”.
Research has demonstrated that web pages often expose a user’s
browsing history to numerous third-parties in tandem [12, 22–24].
Quite often these parties collect data on users’ behavior so that they
may be shown advertisements which are tailored to their interests.
The benefit of this system is that users may enjoy learning about
products and services relevant to their lives, website operators are
able to make the most efficient use of limited screen space, and
vendors are able to directly reach potential customers. However,
these commercial imperatives come at a cost to personal privacy
and are poorly regulated.
Despite the fact that half of the top ten companies in the world
ranked by market value conduct web tracking, there is very little
formal oversight of the practice.1 One reason for this is that the
United States lacks a top-level data protection authority.2 While
nations in the European Union have designated data protection
authorities, researchers have found that third-parties routinely ig-
nore regulations designed to police the use of third-party tracking
cookies and deem the approach a “failure” [39]. The data collec-
tion industry claims that formal oversight is not needed due to
the adherence to a “self-regulatory” framework called “notice and
choice”.
Under the notice and choice framework, users are theoretically
notified that data collection is taking place and given options to
control the practice (often called an “opt-out”). According to in-
dustry group Network Advertising Initiative, member companies
follow a code which “requires notice and choice with respect to
Interest-Based Advertising, limits the types of data that member
1According to Statistica, Alphabet (Google), Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook, and Tencent
are all in the top ten: https://www.statista.com/statistics/263264/top-companies-in-
the-world-by-market-value/
2Although the U.S. Federal Trade Commission has been involved in online privacy for
years, the primary remit of the agency is not data protection.
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companies can use for advertising purposes, and imposes a host of
substantive restrictions on member companies’ collection, use, and
transfer of data used for Interest-Based Advertising” [31]. Despite
the fact that targeted advertising now supports the vast majority
of online publications, social media sites, and search engines, there
has been very little auditing to determine if self-regulatory frame-
works are in fact being followed. A 2011 evaluation of compliance
with industry-defined guidelines for notice and choice conducted
by Komanduri et al is one of the most notable studies of the topic
[20].
Although a large volume of academic literature has identified the
parties which collect data on websites and deficiencies in the nature
of online privacy policies, there has been virtually no attempt to de-
termine if the parties that collect data on a given site are disclosed in
the policy of that site. This study presents the first attempt at audit-
ing disclosure of third-party data flows in website privacy policies
and a new software tool, policyxray, is presented. policyxray
facilitates large-scale auditing of privacy policies and has been used
to determine if policies for 207,000 websites accurately disclose the
third-parties which collect user data.
Privacy policies are also analyzed to determine if the text is easy
to understand, how long the text would take to read, and if the
“Do Not Track” choice mechanism is respected. Network traffic
is inspected to determine if transport encryption is used. Finally,
rather than treating third-parties as an undifferentiated whole, the
policies and practices of 25 prominent data collectors are examined
in order to reveal variations in practices.
Third-party data collection is wide-spread, but fewer than 15% of
attributed data flows are disclosed. The third-parties most likely to
be disclosed are those with consumer services users may be aware
of, those without consumer services are mentioned in less than 1%
of instances. Policies are difficult to understand and the average time
requirement to read both a given site’s policy and the associated
third-party policies exceeds 84 minutes. Only 7% of first-party site
policies mention the Do Not Track signal, and the majority of such
mentions are to specify that the signal is ignored. Among third-
party policies examined, none offer unqualified support for the Do
Not Track signal. Findings indicate that current implementations
of notice and choice fail to provide notice or respect choice.
2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS: NOTICE, CHOICE,
AND SECURITY
The overarching purpose of this study is to evaluate the efficacy of
the notice and choice policy regime. However, there are no com-
monly agreed upon definitions of what constitutes sufficient notice
or choice on the web. In the United States this may be partially
attributed to the fact that the Federal Trade Commission’s guid-
ance on the topic has been “consistently inconsistent” [15]. In the
European Union, the ePrivacy Directive (sometimes referred to as
the “cookie law”) is being replaced by the ePrivacy Regulation in
2018 and there remains substantial uncertainty as to what changes
will arise from the transition.
One potential metric for notice is the industry-favored approach
of the “AdChoices” icon, a small blue arrow which sits in the corner
of advertisements. When clicked upon, the icon will take a user
to information about the party responsible for the ad. However,
not all third-parties show ads, thus AdChoices cannot offer full
disclosure of all parties collecting data. Furthermore, researchers
have found that “the purpose of these icons, to provide information
to consumers, eluded participants, even when the icons were shown
in context on an advertisement” [44].
It is possible that mentions of sharing data with undefined “third-
parties” may be viewed as providing notice in the context of a
privacy policy. However, given that users are subject to both first-
and third-party privacy policies, this type of ambiguous notice does
not provide users with a means to evaluate all policies to which they
are subject. Indeed, different parties have different policies, and
users must know the names of specific data collectors to exercise
meaningful choice. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, merely
mentioning ambiguous “third-party” data sharing does not qualify
as meaningful notice.
In absence of agreed upon guidelines, purposefully limited ques-
tions have been asked in order to determine the degree to which
users receive notice and are able to convey choices. Three decisions
have been made to simplify the scope of the evaluation. First, in
place of evaluating inconsistent icons and modal dialogues, this
study evaluates human-readable privacy policies as the vehicle for
notice. Second, in order to establish a benchmark for choice, men-
tion of, and respect for, the “Do Not Track” (DNT) browser signal
is evaluated. While the online advertising industry has advocated
for many different forms of choice ranging from setting “opt-out”
cookies to instructing users to disable third-party cookies,3 DNT
is the only signal common to all major browsers and its develop-
ment was encouraged by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission [43].4
Finally, in regards to the security of data transmission, the use of
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) transport encryption is measured.
Based on the above scoping decisions, the research questions
being asked regarding Notice are as follows:
• Who are the third-parties which collect user data onwebsites,
and do they have consumer services users may already be
aware of?
• If users read a privacy policy from a given website will they
learn of the specific third-parties which receive their data?
• How time-consuming and difficult is it to understand website
privacy policies?
• How time-consuming and difficult is it to understand third-
party privacy policies?
Questions regarding Choice are as follows:
• Do website privacy policies mention and respect Do Not
Track signals?
3There is significant variability in how users may “opt-out” of tracking and opting-out
of one service may mean opting-in to another. For example, Criteo is one of many
services which require setting an opt-out cookie, and state in their policy that: “if your
browser settings prevent the use of...third party cookies in general, the choice mechanisms
offered by the platforms above will not operate properly.” Conversely, Oracle instructs
users to turn off third-party cookies to opt-out of tracking, which would have the effect
of disabling the Criteo opt-out: “Oracle does not uniformly process do-not-track signals
from browsers. However, you may prevent Oracle from collecting Interest Segments using
Cookies on a browser by blocking third-party Cookies in that browser.” Thus, Criteo
and Oracle have policies which are fundamentally incompatible on a technical level.
However, if both Criteo and Oracle interpreted “Do Not Track” as an opt-out, this
contradiction could be easily resolved.
4It is important to note that the F.T.C. also stated that “work remains to be done on Do
Not Track” in 2012, and such work remains unfinished in 2018.[43]
• Do third-party privacy policies mention and respect Do Not
Track signals?
Questions regarding Security are as follows:
• What percentage of websites force encrypted connections?
• What percentage of third-party requests are encrypted?
3 METHODOLOGY
While the above research questions are relatively limited in scope,
answering them is a non-trivial task and new methods have been
developed for this study. The first task required is to determine the
third-parties which collect data on a given website and if the data
transfer is secure. For this task, the webxray software platform is
used to monitor third-party network traffic generated by loading
a given web page and attribute such traffic to the entities which
receive the data. Second, website privacy polices must be identified,
extracted, and audited. For this task, a new module for webxray,
named policyxray, has been developed. Although Cranor et al
have previously automated analysis of financial website policies
[10], policyxray is the first tool capable of auditing disclosure of
specific third-party data flows in website privacy policies and rep-
resents a step forward in the automation of privacy policy analysis.
Finally, the relevant policies of third-party data collectors must be
selected using a manual process. These steps are described below.
3.1 webxray
webxray is a software platform which measures data leakage to
third-parties when loading a given website. webxray leverages an
extensive hand-curated library which attributes ownership of third-
party domains to the services and corporate entities which control
them. webxray has previously been used in academic research [17,
24, 25, 35] and the webxray attribution library has been used to
augment findings in other platforms such as OpenWPM [12, 38].
To use webxray, one must first generate a list of web pages which
are then loaded in a web browser. During page loading, HTTP el-
ement request and receive events are monitored. To determine
privacy leakage, third-party requests are identified by comparing
the domain of the page (e.g. “example.com”) to the domain of the
request (e.g. “tracker.com”). Sub-domains are ignored so that a re-
quest to a domain such as “images.example.com” is not recorded
as a third-party. There is no purely automated mechanism to dis-
ambiguate between site-specific sub domains and country-specific
sub-domains (e.g. “example.co.uk”), so the Mozilla Public Suffix list
is used for this task.5
Once third-party domains are identified, webxray searches for
them in an internal database of domain ownership. The webxray
database is the product of years of detective work as automated
tools such as whois are unable to reveal the owners of anonymously
registered domains. The process for determining domain ownership
is often laborious, but focused human attention produces results
not currently achievable by purely machine-driven approaches.6
The webxray attribution database has been modified for this project
to reveal the hierarchy of ownership which connects a service to a
parent company. For example, webxray is able to determine that
5See https://publicsuffix.org for additional details.
6For example, the owner of one domain was only determined after locating obscure
developer documentation.
the domain “convertro.com” is owned by Convertro, which is a
subsidiary of Aol, which is a subsidiary of Oath, which in turn is
owned by American telecommunications giant Verizon.
webxray currently supports both the Google Chrome browser
and the PhantomJS headless browser. Chrome has the benefit of
being the same browser many users employ and is suitable for
small volumes of pages. Due to non-trivial resource requirements
and instability when many instances are run in parallel, Chrome
is poorly suited for large volumes of pages.7 For this study, the
headless browser PhantomJS has been used. On a suitably robust
machine, 64 parallel instances of PhantomJS can be easily run.
A computer located at an academic institution in the United
States is used to conduct measurement. Using a computer on a
university IP block produces better measures than using a cloud
hosting provider such as Amazon Web Services due to the fact that
IP addresses from cloud hosts are often blocked as they may be used
for site scraping and click-fraud. A major strength of this study is
that a cloud service is not used for measurement tasks. 8
3.2 policyxray
policyxray is a newly developed module for webxray which ex-
tracts privacy policies and audits their content for disclosure of the
specific third-parties which collect data on a given page. It is the
first tool designed to audit observed third-party tracking in website
privacy policies and represents the most significant contribution of
this study.
policyxray relies on a modification to the webxray software
which facilitates the harvesting of privacy policy links. When
webxray loads a page, it extracts all of the links on the page. The
text of each link is evaluated to see if it contains the sub-string
“privacy policy”. The first such mention is recorded as the policy
link and searching stops. If there is no match, the following strings
are searched for in order: “privacy”, “terms of service”, “terms of
use”. Given that policy links are usually found in the footer of a
page, links are evaluated in a bottom-to-top order relative to page
layout.
When policyxray is run, it attempts to load the URL correspond-
ing to a given site’s privacy policy. Next, policyxray attempts to
extract the policy text from the page so that it may be evaluated
independently of other page elements such as sidebars or footers.
This is necessary because social media companies such as Facebook
and Twitter are often mentioned in the text of a footer link, but
may not be present in the policy. Figure 1 illustrates an example of
how policy text differs from page text.
Extracting policy content from a web page is a difficult problem
given variations in website coding styles. To overcome this, the
Readability.js Javascript library is used. Readability.js is an open-
source project maintained by Mozilla which provides an automated
method for extracting page content by removing boilerplate sec-
tions such as page headers and footers. In order to leverage Readabil-
ity.js, policyxray loads a page with either Chrome or PhantomJS,
injects the Readability script into the page, executes it, and strips
any remaining HTML elements from the text.
7This is true even when running Chrome in headless mode.
8For example, the Google Scholar webpage is easily accessible from a university IP,
but loading the same page from a cloud service IP address results in a block.
HEADER
FOOTER
SIDEBAR POLICY TEXT
Figure 1: Footer blocks frequently include the names of so-
cial media companies. Such mentions may generate a false
positive that the company is mentioned in the policy; there-
fore policyxray extracts only the policy text of a page.
Readability uses a measure of “link density” to determine if a
given page section is likely to be a navigational block, and therefore
not a part of the article (see [19] for an extended discussion of link
density). An earlier incarnation of the Readability.js library was
produced by Arc90 Labs; research from 2010 found that version
of Readability performed with 95.90% accuracy [37]. Readability is
in active development and both Firefox and Safari use it for their
“Reader View” features.
To verify that the extracted policy text is in fact a privacy policy,
a basic sanity check is done to verify that the page title or text
contains the strings “privacy” or “cookie”. Furthermore, manual
inspection of a random sample of harvested text found that 100%
of samples contained only policy text (95% confidence with +/- 5%
interval).
The main purpose of policyxray is to determine if the parties
identified collecting data on a given page by webxray are disclosed
in that page’s privacy policy. To do so, the name of each domain
owner is searched for in the policy text, if it is found, it is counted
as disclosed. If a given owner is not found, policyxray recursively
searches for mention of any parent organizations. Thus, if “con-
vertro.com” is found on a page by webxray, policyxraywill search
for the strings “Convertro”, “Aol”, “Oath”, and “Verizon”. In cases
where there may be variations in the name of a service, such as
“DoubleClick” and “Double Click”, both are searched for. This pro-
cess allows for a purposefully inclusive approach to auditing dis-
closure and is designed to give as many opportunities as possible
for disclosure to be observed.9
9The company “Inform” was excluded from analysis due to the fact the word “inform”
appears with high frequency independently of the company being disclosed. Including
“Inform” vastly skews overall findings.
To determine if the “Do Not Track” (DNT) standard is mentioned
and respected in a policy, the string “do not track” is searched for
in the policy text. This step is easy to automate, but determining if
the string is in reference the DNT standard, and if the choice signal
is respected, is a difficult task. For this study, a random sample of
policies with a match on “do not track” are manually evaluated to
determine if the match is a reference to the DNT standard, and if
so, if respect for user choice is clear.
Finally, policies are evaluated to determine how difficult they
are to read and the time needed to read them. In regards to reading
difficulty, the well-established Flesch Reading Ease metric is used.
This metric is a means of measuring the difficulty of reading a text
written in the English language. In regards to time taken to read
a policy, this study adopts the approach of McDonald and Cranor
who “assumed an average reading rate of 250 words per minute”
[28].
3.3 Selection of Third-Party Privacy Policies
There are threemain reasons a third-partymay be collecting data on
a given website. First, the party may be a Content Delivery Network
(CDN). In this case, data collection may be viewed as incidental and
largely outside the scope of notice and choice. Second, the party
may be a service used for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
mitigation and data collection may also be viewed as incidental. In
the final case, a third-party may be collecting user data for audi-
ence tracking, online advertising, data brokerage, or other tasks
which require processing and storing data related to the behavior
of specific users.10
Once webxray has produced a ranked report of the third-parties
most frequently found in the studied population of sites, those
parties which are CDNs and DDoS mitigation services are excluded
from further consideration. For the remaining parties, the most
salient privacy policy is chosen manually. The considerations in
this process are first to choose the policy which is most applicable
to third-party data collection, is written in English, and if there are
policies for more than one country, the U.S. policy is used to reflect
the location of the machine being used for the study. Once the
policies are selected, it is possible to isolate the policy text, identify
Do Not Track clauses if present, and evaluate readability.
3.4 Limitations
While the methods perform well at scale, they are not without limi-
tation. First, because PhantomJS was used as a browser, requests
for Flash elements may be missed and thus a given company col-
lecting data will not be identified. Prior research has observed that
PhantomJS may not successfully load some pages [12], but user-
agent randomization greatly reduces this issue. Likewise, due to
rapid ingestion of pages, it is possible that the IP address used for
collection be black listed for appearing to be a “bot” and pages and
elements will not load.
Second, due to the nature of real-time ad bidding, websites which
rely on advertising will likely expose users to different parties on
each page load depending on what parties win a given auction.
Thus, for sites with advertising, loading pages a single time will
produce an under-count of the number of parties which may collect
10The term “natural persons” may also apply here.
user data on the site. However, because webxray’s database of
domain ownership primarily contains major ad networks rather
than small clients, and policyxray only searches for identified
parties, variability in the long-tail of trackers may not have an
outsized effect on overall findings related to disclosure. Nonetheless,
it is important to point out that the number of parties being searched
for is fewer than the total number of parties present.
Third, although Readability.js is used by major browsers and
has been tested in prior research, it is not perfect and it is possible
portions of a policy may not be extracted. If such portions contain
the only mention of a given third-party, that will produce a false
negative. Conversely, if extraneous non-policy text is included,
and that text includes the a mention of a given third-party, it may
produce a false positive. However, as noted above, a sample of
collected policies detected no such issues.
Finally, due to the fast pace of ownership changes in the online
advertising market, it is possible that some parties may have new
parents or subsidiaries which are not yet reflected in the webxray
database. While the above limitations may impact findings, this
study nonetheless represents the first attempt to perform the task of
auditing the disclosure of third-party data flows in website privacy
policies at scale.
4 RESEARCH FINDINGS
In October 2017, a computer based at a United States academic
institution is used to scan one million popular websites as identified
by the Alexa company using the webxray software platform. Of
these pages, 938,093 are successfully loaded and privacy policy
links for 248,029 pages are extracted. policyxray is used to extract
184,897 unique policies corresponding to 207,000 sites. The number
of policies is lower than the number of sites because sites owned
by a single entity often share policies. Of the most prevalent third-
parties receiving user data, 25 are selected for their pertinence to the
study of notice and choice and their privacy policies are extracted
for analysis.
Findings shed light on the general state of tracking on popular
websites, the nature of the third-parties collecting user data, rates
of disclosure for third-party data flows, the complexity and length
of privacy policies, respect for the “Do Not Track” (DNT) standard,
and the security practices used by popular websites and third-party
data collectors. Taken as a whole, findings demonstrate that there is
poor disclosure of third-party data collection, policies are difficult
and time consuming to read, DNT is rarely respected, and security
practices are suboptimal. The follow sections address these findings
in detail.
4.1 Current State of Web Privacy
Prior work has investigated the state of tracking on the Alexa top
one million websites in both 2015 and 2016 [12, 24]. It is therefore
useful to briefly provide an overview of the current state of web
tracking in order to contribute to the historical record.
Of the 938,093 pages which loaded successfully, 91.27% initiate a
request to download a third-party page element, thereby potentially
exposing users to cross-site tracking. Pages which initiate a third-
party request expose users to an average of 10.89 unique domains
per page-load. The number of third-party requests for the top 10,000
Table 1: Third-Party Prevalence, SSL Use, and First-Party
Disclosure
†Denotes Company has Consumer Services
Company % Tracked % SSL % Disclosed
Google † 82.81 80.35 38.29
Facebook † 33.37 91.61 17.50
Twitter † 12.26 90.43 10.74
AppNexus 11.97 59.98 0.44
Oracle 11.21 41.51 3.72
Adobe † 10.14 70.48 5.77
Oath † 9.67 57.64 4.42
The Trade Desk 7.38 56.49 0.12
Acxiom 7.10 34.21 0.26
Rubicon Project 6.68 71.62 0.12
OpenX 5.78 52.50 0.29
Lotame 5.71 29.82 0.29
IPONWEB 5.64 66.11 0.07
Casale Media 5.05 63.74 0.05
Criteo 4.93 62.26 2.75
Neustar 4.78 40.05 0.04
PubMatic 4.61 54.27 0.19
Media Math 4.60 56.23 0.04
Microsoft † 4.57 72.27 12.56
comScore 4.57 53.42 1.74
Nielsen Online 4.03 41.41 0.35
AdForm 3.96 50.71 0.88
New Relic 3.94 97.18 0.60
Quantcast 3.71 46.01 1.46
Rocketfuel 3.65 59.83 0.10
sites is 20, whereas for the bottom 10,000 it is 10 (see Figure 3 for
detail). 70.60% of page loads result in the setting of a third-party
cookie, and pages with third-party cookies have an average of 11.24
distinct cookies per-page. 86.84% of pages include Javascript code
loaded from a third-party domain.
4.2 Identification of 25 Prominent Third-Party
Data Collectors
As noted above, webxray uses a database of domain ownership
which provides a hierarchical means to trace ownership of data
collected by third-parties on the web. Table 1 shows 25 of the most
prominent data collectors discovered on the Alexa top one million
websites. The parties are chosen because they are primarily active
in the processing and storing of the data of users rather than content
hosting or DDoS mitigation. Likewise, all of the parties chosen set
third-party cookies which may be used for cross-site tracking. In
cases where nearly all of a single company’s data was traced back
to a subsidiary, the subsidiary was selected in place of the parent.
This was the case with Google (an Alphabet subsidiary) and Oath
(a Verizon subsidiary).
Table 1 shows the percentage of sites which may be tracked by
a given third-party. It is important to note that that for all of the
companies chosen, the percentage of sites tracked is a composite
measure. For example, if Aol and Yahoo are on the same site, the
site is counted once each for Aol, Yahoo, and Oath rather than
twice for Oath. These composite measures provide insight into the
reach of various companies. For example, Google tracks over 82%
of sites, Facebook over 33%, and Twitter over 12% 11. Table 1 also
illustrates a long-tail distribution of third-party data collectors. The
fifth place company, Oracle, tracks 11.21% of sites, a fraction of
Google. Likewise, the 25th place company, Rocketfuel, tracks 3.65%,
a fraction of Oracle.
Returning to the evaluation of notice, it may be assumed that
if users have pre-existing consumer relationships with a company
they may already be familiar with data collection practices. For
example, Twitter’s privacy policy states that “We may personalize
the Services for you based on your visits to third-party websites
that integrate Twitter content such as embedded timelines or Tweet
buttons”.12 Thus, from a perspective of notice and choice, consumer
services such as social media, search, and email may theoretically
have provided notice of data collection independently of site poli-
cies.
Of the 25 companies examined, only six have consumer services.
Therefore, for the majority of third-party data collectors there is
virtually no chance users will have awareness of data collection
practices due to prior interaction with a service. It is also worth
noting that just because a company has a consumer service that
does mean that all users whomay be tracked are users of the service.
For example, people who do not use Twitter, and have no reason to
read Twitter’s privacy policy, may still be tracked by Twitter.
4.3 Disclosure of Companies in Privacy
Policies
The crux of this study is an evaluation of whether or not website
privacy policies provide notice of the third parties which collect
data on a given site. As detailed in the methods section, webxray
is used to determine the third-parties which collect user data on
a given site. For 207,000 websites, policyxray is used to verify
if these companies are mentioned in the site’s privacy policy. A
total of 1,807,491 instances of data transmission to a known third-
party are audited. It is found that only 14.80% of data transmissions
to identified third-parties are disclosed. Users who read website
privacy policies are therefore very unlikely to be notified of the
parties which collect their data.
While the overall rate of disclosure is low, it is not uniform
across parties. As Table 1 shows, transfers to Google are disclosed
in 38.29% of cases. While over 60% of transfers to Google are not
disclosed, there is clearly a strong possibility users may learn of
data transfer either through a site policy, or through Google’s own
policies. For companies with consumer services, disclosure is lowest
for the Oath group with 4.42%. Again, because Aol and Yahoo are
Oath subsidiaries it is possible users are notified via consumer
policies. For all companies with consumer services, the average
rate of disclosure is 14.88%.
Among the 25 prominent third-parties inspected, disclosure for
non-consumer services is sharply lower. For the 19 services which
most users are likely unaware of, the average rate of disclosure is
11It is interesting to note that Twitter is down from 18% in May 2014, and this is a
trend worth exploring if the social network declines in relevance [24].
12https://twitter.com/en/privacy
Table 2: Third-Party Privacy Policy Characteristics
†Denotes DNT Mention
‡Denotes DNT Partially Respected
Company Word Count Reading Ease
Google 2773 39.67
Facebook 2701 48.94
Twitter 3799 35.1
AppNexus 3901 43.22
Oracle † 4844 29.18
Adobe 1700 29.08
Oath † 2461 35.61
The Trade Desk † 5731 39.06
Acxiom 881 26.61
Rubicon Project 720 37.84
OpenX †‡ 3345 35.31
Lotame †‡ 3150 29.48
IPONWEB 947 29.48
Casale Media 1301 25.90
Criteo † 3287 38.25
Neustar 5903 31.31
PubMatic † 4360 18.42
Media Math 4794 39.16
Microsoft † 25367 40.89
comScore † 873 35.27
Nielsen Online 1566 42.41
AdForm 2134 26.85
New Relic 4150 43.06
Quantcast 2924 40.79
Rocketfuel 3445 35.10
Average 3882 35.48
less than 1%. Simply put, if a user does not have a pre-existing con-
sumer relationship with a third-party there is virtually no chance
they will learn of these parties by reading privacy policies.
4.4 Readability of Policies
Beyond mere mention of the parties collecting user data, privacy
policies for websites may detail a host of other issues related to
data storage, retention, and use. However, in order for this infor-
mation to be useful, it must be understood by most users. While
the degree to which a given text is understandable relies on a host
of factors ranging from a given user’s literacy to familiarity with
the minutia of data protection regulations, it is possible to use the
well-established Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) metric to evaluate the
difficulty of reading a given text.
FRE scores range from 0-100, with lower scores indicating the
text is more challenging to read. Given that it is difficult for indi-
viduals to consent to contracts which they cannot understand, the
U.S. state of Florida requires that insurance policies are written in a
way which generates “a minimum score of 45 on the Flesch reading
ease test”.13
13Florida Statutes Section 627.4145 - Readable Language In Insurance Policies. (Fla.
Stat. §627.4145)
Figure 2: Sites ranked higher in Alexa tend to have longer
policies (blue), but Flesch Reading Ease (red) shows much
less variation.
0 20 40 60 80 100
1,000
1,500
2,000
Alexa Rank Averaged per 10,000
Word Count
Reading Ease (Scaled x30)
Analysis of website privacy policies reveals that they have an
average FRE score of 39.83.14 Thus, if an average website privacy
policy were an insurance policy in the state of Florida, it would not
pass basic legal requirements.
When turning attention to the privacy policies of the 25 promi-
nent data collectors detailed in Table 2, it is found that the average
readability score, 35.48, is lower than that forwebsite policies. Again,
if these policies were for insurance in Florida, rather than online
privacy, they would not be valid.
There is significant variation between various third-party poli-
cies. Facebook has the most readable policy, with a score of 48.94;
at the bottom end, PubMatic has a score of 18.42, which makes it
more difficult to read than an article in the Harvard Law Review
[29].
4.5 Time Required to Read Policies
In 2008, McDonald and Cranor posed an intriguing question: “If
website users were to read the privacy policy for each site they
visit just once a year, what would their time be worth?” [28]. By
analyzing the “word count of the 75 most popular websites”, they
determined that the “national opportunity cost” of reading privacy
policies would be $781 billion dollars. The present study updates
McDonald and Cranor‘s findings, vastly expands the number of poli-
cies studied, and introduces a new composite measure to determine
the time taken to read both first- and third-party policies.
Across policies for 207,000 sites, the average number of words
per-policy is 1,404. Using “an average reading rate of 250 words per
minute”, an average website policy would require 5.6 minutes to
read [28]. This is lower than the average of 10 minutes found by
McDonald and Cranor in 2008. This is due to the fact that policies for
14This level of difficulty shows little variation relative to the Alexa rank of a given site
(see Figure 2).
sites ranked higher by Alexa tend to have longer policies, whereas
the majority tend to be significantly shorter (see Figure 2).
One possible reason policies for highly-ranked sites are longer
may be that they are written by teams of lawyers who create de-
tailed, custom policies. In comparison, low-ranked sites likely do
not have the resources needed to generate complex policies. Nev-
ertheless, it appears that when looking at the larger population of
sites, the time requirements of reading an average website policy
could be much lower than earlier work estimated. However, this
may not be the case.
As the findings presented thus far make clear, a user visiting
a given website is subject to many policies: those of the website
as well as the third-party data collectors. As Table 2 details, the
average length of a third-party privacy policy is 3,882 words and
would require 15.5 minutes to read, nearly three times a website
privacy policy.
Because a single site may expose users to several policies in
tandem, it is possible to calculate the total time needed to read
all applicable policies of a given site. Considering that the total
minutes to read applicable site policies is the sum of the word count
of the first-party policy (WCf p ) and the word count of all third-
party policies (WCtp ), divided by 250, the following formula may
be derived:
tmins =
WCf p +
∑
WCtp
250
Applying this formula reveals that the total time needed to read
all applicable policies for a given site is 84.7 minutes on average.
This calculation does not take into account that users may not
need to re-read a third-party policy on every site they view, and is
only applicable to the first site in which the total set of policies is
encountered.
As previous sections detailed, there is a low probability users
will be aware of third-party policies to start with, and it is highly
unlikely any user would have the ability to locate relevant policies,
let alone the time to read them. Thus, the assertion is not that that
users actually spend over an hour reading policies, rather this find-
ing underscores that the notice and choice regime is fundamentally
untenable when the full range of policies is considered.
4.6 Respect for User Choices
As the above findings have made clear, the likelihood of a user
receiving notice of the third-parties receiving their data by reading
a site’s privacy policy is remarkably low. However, it is possible
that users could express their choices to control data collection in a
way which would not require user notification. The “Do Not Track”
(DNT) mechanism accomplishes this task and is a means for users
to communicate their desire not to be tracked to parties receiving
HTTP requests.
DNT is a setting available in all major web browsers and is
easy for users to enable. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has
been highly supportive of the standard and encouraged its develop-
ment [43]. According to the technical specification, DNT provides a
“means of allowing users to express their preferences about tracking,
including to opt out of tracking some or all of the time” [27].
DNT may be viewed as a polite request and there is no techni-
cal mechanism to force compliance on the part of data collectors.
Rather, data collectors must commit to respect the expressed choice
signal in their policy documents. This study is the first to examine
support of DNT for both websites and third-party data collectors
at scale.
Across the population of website policies analyzed, 8% contain
the string “do not track”. A manual analysis of a sample of policies
determines if the string is in reference to DNT, and if so, if DNT
is honored. It is found that 15% of instances of the “do not track”
phrase are not in reference to DNT (e.g. “we do not track users”
was a common phrase that is not DNT-related per se). Thus, when
rounding to the nearest integer, 7% of all policies discuss DNT.
Of policies mentioning DNT, 77% explicitly do not honor it. For
example, one representative policy stated that “we will not disable
tracking technology that may be active on the Sites in response to
any ‘do not track’ requests that we receive from your browser”.15 A
policy for a government website in Arkansas specifies that “While
the United States Federal Trade Commission has endorsed DNT,
our Sites do not currently support DNT codes.” 16
Only 23% of policies mentioning DNT contain a clear commit-
ment to honor a user’s DNT preference. One such commitment is
found in the following statement: “We honor do not track signals
and do not track, plant cookies, or use advertising when a Do Not
Track (DNT) browser mechanism is in place.” However, it is impor-
tant to reiterate that such commitments are voluntary and difficult
to audit.
Given that a single website may not have the ability to “track”
users between sites, the language of DNT may not be fully ap-
plicable. However, for the third-parties which track users across
the web, DNT has particular salience. Furthermore, whereas small
website operators may be ignorant of the DNT standard, major
third-party data collectors are well aware of it and employ lawyers
with expertise in data protection regulations.
Despite this awareness, only nine of 25 data collectors mention
the DNT standard in their privacy policies. As with first-party dis-
closures, the majority of these mentions are to specify that DNT is
ignored. Only two third-parties, OpenX and Lotame, offer qualified
support for DNT. Lotame’s policy represents the best respect for the
spirit of DNT: “If Lotame receives a ‘Do Not Track’ signal from any
browser other than Internet Explorer, Lotame will implement an
opt-out.” Twitter was previously the largest party to respect DNT,
but has recently stopped doing so.
4.7 Security Practices
In addition to notice and choice, guidelines for online advertising
often include provisions for ensuring data security. U.S. Federal
Trade Commission online advertising guidelines from 2009 assert
that “Any company that collects and/or stores consumer data for
behavioral advertising should provide reasonable security for that
data”[42]. Likewise, the “Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Be-
havioral Advertising” authored by industry trade group Internet
Advertising Bureau dictate that: “Entities should maintain appropri-
ate physical, electronic, and administrative safeguards to protect the
data collected and used for Online Behavioral Advertising purposes”
[4].
15http://www.cmaworld.com/privacy/
16http://www.arkansas.gov/policies/privacy-policy
Figure 3: Higher ranked sites force SSL more often (blue),
but also initiate more third-party requests (red).
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In the context of third-party data transfer on the web, there are
two main technical factors involved in protecting user data: storage
encryption and transport encryption. Storage encryption applies to
how data is protected once it reaches its destination and protects
against unauthorized parties reading data after it has been received
and processed. Transport encryption refers to the process by which
data is encrypted as it is transferred over the Internet and protects
against network adversaries reading the data.
It is impossible to verify if third-parties collecting user data are
employing sufficient storage encryption without an independent
auditing body. At present, no such body provides publicly-available
reports of security practices. However, it is possible to determine if
transport encryption is being used by examining the network traffic
generated when loading a page in order to determine if connections
are made utilizing Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) connections.
While transport encryption adoption has been increasing, there
is still a large volume of unencrypted traffic which places user
data at risk of interception. Of all pages examined, 35.14% redirect
users to an SSL-secured HTTPS page after being requested via an
HTTP request. As Figure 3 illustrates, higher-ranked websites force
SSL connections more often. In terms of page content, 52.25% of
all element requests are encrypted. However, there is significant
variability in encryption between first- and third-party requests:
first-party are encrypted in 35.52% of cases compared to 66.82% for
third-parties.
The above findings suggests that third-parties may have supe-
rior data security practices. However, as Table 1 illustrates, there
is huge variability in the encryption practices of the 25 examined
third-party data collectors. Facebook, Twitter, and New Relic all
encrypt over 90% of requests. In contrast, Oracle, Acxiom, Lotame,
Neustar, Nielsen Online, and Quantcast encrypt fewer than half of
all requests. This wide variability underscores how self-regulation
produces wildly differing practices among data collectors and sug-
gests that clear standards should be adopted and enforced.
5 PRIORWORK
This study builds directly on three established lines of research,
those investigating web privacy and third-party tracking, those
addressing privacy policy usability, and those addressing legal and
normative objections to notice and choice.
Web privacy and third-party tracking is an active area of research.
Krishnamurthy and Wills conducted several early censuses of third-
party tracking [22]. More recently both Libert and Englehardt and
Narayanan have investigated tracking on the Alexa one million
most popular sites [12, 24]. Several studies have looked at the lon-
gitudinal evolution of third-party tracking on the web [21, 23],
defenses against tracking [33], the economics of online tracking
[7, 16], tracking on smartphone apps [45, 47], and the prevalence of
different tracking methods [1, 6, 8]. Beyond general censuses, many
studies have looked at specific implications of third-party tracking:
Libert has investigated tracking on health-related webpages [25],
Englehardt et al have investigated the nexus between web tracking
and state-sponsored surveillance [13], and Hauschke has detailed
tracking on library websites [17].
Numerous studies have investigated usability aspects of the no-
tice and choice policy framework. McDonald and Cranor inves-
tigated the time required to read policies and the overall cost to
national productivity [28]. Likewise, McDonald et al have con-
ducted comparative work on privacy policies [29]. Another study
from Cranor et al “automatically evaluated 6,191 U.S. financial in-
stitutions’ privacy notices” [10]. Reidenberg et al investigated the
degree to which users have trouble understanding policies [32],
while Acquisti and Grossklags have found that “even if individuals
had access to complete information...they might still deviate from
the rational strategy” [3]. Wilson et al have evaluated the feasilibty
of crowdsourcing annotation of privacy policies [46]. Komanduri
et al found that members of online advertising industry groups
the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) and Digital Advertising
Alliance (DAA) did not always follow their own notice and choice
guidelines [20].
Legal and normative scholars have extensively addressed funda-
mental issues with the notice and choice policy regime. Solove has
stated that the regime “cannot achieve the goals demanded of it,
and it has been pushed beyond its limits” [36]. Cate has criticized
the fact that the FTC has chosen not to regulate privacy practices,
but instead “focused virtually all of its...efforts on getting websites
to post privacy policies and its enforcement efforts on suing website
operators when they fail to follow those policies” [9]. Barocas and
Nissenbuam have observed that “users who are subject to [online
tracking] confront not only significant hurdles but full-on barriers
to achieving meaningful understanding of the practice and uses
to which they are expected to be able to consent” [5]. Rotenberg
has asserted that the notice and choice paradigm is “a relatively
recent creation of the U.S. marketing industry” and is at odds with
internationally recognized data protection frameworks [34].
6 CONCLUSION
This study has shown empirically for the first time that the notice
and choice policy regime fails to notify users reading privacy poli-
cies of the parties which collect their data. It also demonstrates
that the time burden for reading both first- and third-party policies
is unmanageable. Furthermore, the “Do Not Track” mechanism is
rarely mentioned in privacy policies, and when it is, it is usually
to specify the expressed user choice is ignored. Finally, while im-
plementing SSL encryption is an easy means of ensuring transport
security, there is uneven support across the third-parties which
collect user data on the web.
Private-sector technologists routinely assert that privacy is a
modern invention which may be viewed as an “anomaly” [18]. Such
a viewpoint is not only ignorant of widely documented instances
where privacy has been endorsed as a foundational social value
by numerous ancient cultures [2, 30], it is also ignorant of the re-
cent history of data protection regulations around the world [15].
Furthermore, decades of survey research have consistently demon-
strated that online privacy is valued by the public [11, 14, 26, 40, 41].
Thus, the true anomaly may be that a massive sector of the global
economy has been regulated by a fundamentally broken approach
which is sharply at odds with public desires.
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